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The majority of the peripheral member states of the Eurozone Portugal, Italy, Spain, and Greece have experienced financial
crises. Until now, the European leaders attempted to solve the crises mainly through austerity measures. For them, either it is an
ideological or a political matter; the answers have identified with the free market beliefs. In this paper, we will argue that until
now all the solutions that have been agreed on the European level do not help to solve the root causes of the Greek financial
problem. The national governments of the European Union do not follow any of the Keynes ian ideas to overcome the cris is. The
European leaders seem to have forgotten their role to act as a policy makers. Under these conditions, even if the Greek financial
problem can be moderated, it cannot be solved. The above observation is highly significant for the future of the European Union
because every currency union in order to survive needs a mechanism of fiscal transfers. This mechanism does not exist in the
Eurozone. Thus, this crisis will continue to affect the performance and function of the EU.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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The European leaders attempted to solve the European crisis mainly through austerity measures. For them, either
it is an ideological or a political matter; the answers have identified with the free market beliefs. This
approach has generated severe social, political, and economic phenomena within the member states. The effective
demand in each peripheral economy shrunk, creating waves of pessimism and unemployment. How has the
* Corresponding author. Telephone: +30 210 4142648 ; Fax: +30 210 4142779.
E-mail address: sroukana@webmail.unipi.gr
Keynes and the Eurozone’s Cr isis: Towar ds a Fiscal Union?
Abstract
1. Int roduction
aAssociate Professor , Dept. of Pol i tical Science & International Relations, Universi ty of Peloponnese, Dervenakion 47 & Ademantou,
bLecturer , Dept. of International and European Studies, Universi ty of Pi raeus, Gr . Lampraki 126, Pi raeus, P.C: 18534, Greece
cPh.D. Candidate, Dept. of Poli tical Science & International Relations, Universi ty of Peloponnese, Dervenakion 47 & Ademantou,
Cor inth, P.C: 20100, Greece
Keywords:
laissez faire
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
 2014 The uthors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
election and peer-revie  under responsibility of avala Institute of echnology, epart ent of ccountancy, reece
67 Pantelis Sklias et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  9 ( 2014 )  66 – 73 
European Union (EU) responded to the severe crisis? As the Greek case shows, the solutions to overcome the crisis
have nothing to do with the most important problems that the member states confront.
This paper argues that even though the last four years many things have changed in the field of European
economic governance, the most important flaws today remain unsolved. In this regard, the ideas of John Maynard
Keynes are needed to be remembered. Almost all the efforts of European leaders to resolve the Eurozone’s crisis are
not related to the development of effective policies for the weak peripheral member states. The EU does not follow
any of the Keynesian ideas in order to overcome the crisis. Thus, the political economy of austerity does not provide
an adequate solution for the peripheral member states like Greece. A new approach for the European economic
governance is needed.
This paper is organized as follows. In the first section, the main theoretical arguments of John Maynard Keynes
will be presented. It will then proceed with the analysis of the main vulnerabilities and the main gaps that can be
identified at the European level. The third section will examine the most important events of what we call Greek
story. Finally, it will conclude with policy proposals according to Keynesian rationale.
The global financial crisis suggests that government intervention may be necessary as the market players cannot
form correct perceptions about the direction of the economy. In this regard, Keynes has an unambiguous role to
play. In his writings, Keynes has already provided the missing theoretical link that connects diagnosis and treatment
(Skidelsky 2010). Keynes based his arguments on two important variables namely employment and economic
growth. At the core of his theory one can make notice of the uncertainty about the future (Keynes 1921).
Uncertainty is not only the main reason for the instability of the economies but also hinders the recovery from
financial crises.
Keynes also believed that a great economic recession was always possible in a self-regulating market system. The
states should take the role for implementing a concrete and deliberate management of the economy when the global
demand shrinks. Many times during the financial crises, even if the interest rate (cost of borrowing money) is very
low for various reasons this may not lead the economy to recovery and then the intervention of the state in financing
new investments is necessary (Keynes 1982). The states should intervene through the expansion of fiscal policies in
order to maintain the appropriate effective demand in the economy. This kind of ‘socialization’ of investments could
stabilize the economy. The states should also take the role of investors by creating various compromises and
cooperation mechanisms between public and private parties to ensure full employment (Keynes 2001). As he states:
“It is the policy of an autonomous rate of interest, unimpeded by international preoccupations, and of a national
investment programme directed to an optimum level of domestic employment which is twice blessed in the sense
that it helps ourselves and our neighbours at the same time. And it is the simultaneous pursuit of these policies by all
countries together which is capable of restoring economic health and strength internationally” (Keynes 2001: 366).
Based on this Keynesian perspective, the crisis is a result of the investment volatility. If the state does not take
action to stabilize the total expenditure that it is needed to stabilize the economy then the market economy becomes
unstable as investments are affected by the uncertain expectations about future developments. In good times, the
states should maintain budget surpluses but during financial turmoil should intervene to market economy by creating
deficits in order to give the necessary impetus for growth.
Speculation, the activity of forecasting the psychology of the market is growing as the organization of investment
markets is improving. Keynes (2001: 187) believes that “Americans are apt to be unduly interested in discovering
what average opinion believes average opinion to be; and this national weakness finds its nemesis in the stock
market”. The functioning of securities markets coincides with a “beauty contest” where the prize is awarded to that
competent obtaining the most average preferences. In this way, Keynes (2001: 188) states
“Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when
enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When the capital development of a country becomes a
by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. The measure of success attained by Wall
Street, regarded as an institution of which the proper social purpose is to direct new investment into the most
profitable channels in terms of future yield, cannot be claimed as one of the outstanding triumphs of
capitalism”.
laissez-faire
2. The K eynesian rationale
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The European crisis is not like a ‘Black Swan’ which unexpectedly spread its negative consequences throughout
the world. This means that the European storm did not erupt so unpredictably. In the Eurozone, as in any monetary
union with fixed exchange rates and single currency, there are significant trade and capital imbalances among the
member states. These imbalances may persist for many years, creating an explosive mixture of conditions in the
absence of appropriate institutions that could mitigate their impact. Thus, the most significant vulnerability of the
Eurozone is rather the lack of a European mechanism of fiscal transfers, in order to alleviate the huge trade and
growth gaps for the majority of the peripheral countries. The EU’s mechanism for managing the economic gaps
through macroeconomic coordination is weak and ineffective and the peripheral indebted member states have fewer
options for stocking growth (EUCE 2012). In Bretton Woods, Keynes tried to solve the same problem by making a
proposal for the creation of a global currency, the creation of an international monetary union and all the necessary
institutions.
Even though, the proposals for the establishment of such institutions have been done many years ago, in the
Eurozone there is no a formal or informal mechanism for recycling imbalances yet. For example, Eichengreen
(1991) proposed a system of budgetary transfers for a possible injection of liquidity from other countries. This calls
for a system of redistributive policies which also requires a central fiscal authority (Dibooglu and Horvath 1997). In
this regard, there is a need for an economic institution that could organise not only the monetary but also the
budgetary and fiscal policies in the Eurozone (Verdun 2007). Varoufakis (2012) believes that, this kind of recycling
of budget surpluses can take either the form of standard transfer of money or investments in production activities in
the deficient areas. But how big is the problem today? As figure 1 demonstrates, within the Eurozone there are huge
current account imbalances. In this way, Europe suffers from a kind of trade or capital disequilibrium which is
similar to the disequilibrium between the US and China (Buzgalo 2011). The table 1 shows that, this policy has also
created huge external debts for peripheral counties which they have limited their capacity to repay their debts. The
conclusion is uncontested. Only the peripheral countries with large current account deficits were affected by the
crisis (Gros 2013).
Fig 1. Current Account Imbalances within the Eurozone
Source: (Eurostat, 2013)
The most disappointing of all is the fact that there is a strong political unwillingness from many European
countries to prevent these imbalances and thus, the main problem within the Eurozone remains. Darvas (2013:
2) state “Europe’s pre-crisis growth performance was disappointing enough, but the performance since the onset of
the crisis has been even more dismal”.
3. Themain vulnerabilit iesat the European level
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In 2007, the Commission decided to stop the excessive deficit procedure for Greece, a policy option that was in
contrast to the current financial turmoil (European Commission 2007). Around the same time, many in Greece could
not have predicted the impact of the global crisis. The Greek minister of economic affairs Alogoskoufis (2009)
stated that Greece was fortunately not affected by the global economic crisis as other countries. The same argument
was pointed out by the Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis, who at the end of 2008 was forced by the
economic conditions to admit that the big problem for Greece is that the global crisis will have a negative impact on
the level of government debt (Eleytherotipia 2008). For this end, in January 2009 it was published an “Updated
Stability and Growth Programme 2008-2011” (Ministry of Economics 2009). However, the European Council
warned Greece that the new stability program was unrealistic (Council of the EU 2009). But even then, no one could
predict how the global financial crisis and the debt crisis in Greece were associated with the systemic European
economic governance crisis.
Shortly before the October elections in Greece, the main dispute between the two political parties PASOK and
ND had begun. However, the main arguments of the political campaign of the later Prime Minister George
Papandreou had nothing to do with an organized exit strategy from the crisis. Instead, Papandreou’s speeches mainly
focused on the various political and economic scandals and the unreliability of the opponent party. During this
period, PASOK’s main arguments were based on the economic policy of populism. Papandreou was promising
income support, market revitalization, employment boosting and fiscal discipline. All those were based on his
populist slogan “there is money” (PASOK 2009).
The new government appeared not to have been aware of the severity of the Greek financial problem. For this
reason, it developed no exit strategy from the crisis and very quickly the financial markets closed for Greece. Only
in early 2010 the new government began to take some budgetary measures. However, these attempts were rather
spasmodic movements of the Greek political leadership which was paying very quickly for the error of populist
announcements of the Greek Prime Minister. These inadequate and delayed measures clearly showed that the lack of
an exit strategy from the crisis was the main problem of the leadership of PASOK. At the same time, the financial
markets were fully aware of the structural problems of the Greek economy and did not believe that Greece could
overcome the crisis easily. This also appears from the figure 2.
Under these conditions, a Memorandum of Understanding between the four parties was ratified by Law
3845/2010 on 6 May 2010. This approach greatly differed from previous IMF reform programs because there was
actual involvement of the European Commission and the ECB in writing the terms of agreement and in the
supervision of the implementation of Greek commitments (Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis 2012). In return for the 110
billion euro package, the Greek side should go in hard austerity measures which in fact could have severe structural
implications for Greece to be ignored (Monastiriotis 2011).
4. TheGreek story
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Fig 2. Greek Sovereign Credit Risk Ranking
Source: (CMA, 2013)
The memorandum was ruinous for Greece and its outcome uncertain. First, the creators of the program did not
consider the impact that would have the income reduction in effective demand as they miscalculated the fiscal
multiplier (Standard & Poor’s 2012). Second, the global financial markets affected the severity of austerity measures
in Greece. As De Grauwe and Yuemei (2013: 4) believe “the timing and the intensity of the austerity programmes
have been dictated too much by market sentiment instead of being the outcome of rational decision-making
process”. Third, the technocrats ignored the role of trade unions, syndicates and various interest groups in the
implementation of reforms. Kaplanoglou and Rapanos (2012: 17) state that “more surprising is the degree to which
these features seem to have persisted even after Greece was subjected to an ambitious fiscal adjustment programme
by the three international organizations”. Fourth, the Greek officials showed reluctance to comply with major
institutional reforms (Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis 2012). Fifth, the current demands made by Eurozone officials for
austerity and a smaller, more efficient state apparatus could be understandable but they amount to a demand that
Greek political culture be dramatically changed in a very short time frame. This it is not an easy task for the Greek
and European officials and it seems unlikely to be realized (Sklias and Maris 2013).
The Greek paradigm affirms that the political and institutional convergence within the Eurozone is much more
difficult than the economic one. It seems that all the attempts for modernization and Europeanization not only failed
to create a stable political and economic system in Greece but also solidified a mature clientelistic political system
as the main characteristic of the Greek polity. Even though, the political parties acknowledged the necessity of
reforms and real modernization of the Greek society, at the same time they undermined any effort for reforms and
modernization.
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The European leaders, instead of creating effective policies seem to have forgotten their role as policy makers.
This does not mean that the solutions proposed already are completely ineffective. Rather, we should ask for the
creation of European fiscal transfer mechanisms that can spread the risks and imbalances across the region. The
European crisis is identified with creating a European system of fiscal centralization in order to diffuse growth and
wealth in a more effective and rational way.
The EU should seek immediate policy responses that can mitigate the destruction of the European periphery.
First, the peripheral countries must propose the creation of a Common European System for Taxes by which the
various regional risks and asymmetries can be diffused effectively across the regions. This is not to say that the
national tax systems should be abolished but rather should have a complementary role in order to diffuse and
redistribute the growth across the weakest regions. Thus, the EU’s tax policy strategy as it is proposed from the
European Commission (2001) should be re-examined. The EU should follow the American paradigm where taxes
are imposed both from the federal state, the autonomous states and the local governments.
Second, they must also propose the creation of a European Unemployment Benefit. This potential mechanism
could work as one of the main official mechanisms for growth redistribution of the European social policy. The
American unemployment benefit is in fact a federal state program which is jointly financed through the federal and
the autonomous states. Again this program could complement the unemployment insurance programs in each
member states. In this respect, a European Revenue Service should be created, like the Internal Revenue Service in
the United States, in order to collect a standard rate of taxes.
Third, the peripheral countries should also claim large European investment projects to be transferred to their
periphery. In the United States, this mechanism works very well as the government intervenes in the deficit regions
by creating huge military bases and weapon production factories (Varoufakis 2012). The common European
investment projects not only can be diversified more efficiently across regions and sectors but can also create the
essential mechanism for a balanced development within the Eurozone through the form of productive investments.
This is not to say that the role of the European Investment Bank and the Social Cohesion Funds should be ignored.
Fourth, the EU must also ask for the decentralization of European institutions. The European Commission only
employs 32.666 people by which the 21.467 work in Brussels, 3.908 in Luxembourg, 3.524 in other European
countries and 3.767 in third countries (European Commission 2013). Is there any specific reason for this regional
concentration of the EU’s institutions? The decentralization of the European institutions can help the peripheral
countries to overcome the growing asymmetries within the Eurozone as this decentralization can work as an
unofficial mechanism for recycling the imbalances.
Fifth, they must also claim penalties for the intra-European trade particularly for countries with huge surpluses
like Germany. This Keynesian argument is very simple in its rationale. If the surpluses of a member state exceed an
agreed level of its trade transactions, this country should pay some penalties because these excessive surpluses affect
the stability of the EU. Then the collected taxes can be invested in the deficit member states by creating a virtual
mechanism of automatic stabilizers that can also spread the risks of asymmetries within the Eurozone.
The EU confronts several challenges that must be tackled. The last five years any proposals for fiscal policy
options that could compensate overheating in the indebted peripheral countries failed. In this way, the solutions that
have been agreed on the European level do not help to solve the causes of the Greek financial problem. The
European leaders seem to have forgotten to act as a policy makers and do not follow any of the Keynesian ideas.
Even if the Greek financial problem can be moderated, it cannot be solved.
A new approach for the European economic governance is needed. Undoubtedly, Keynes has an unambiguous
role to play. The above observation is highly significant for the future of the Eurozone because every currency union
in order to survive needs a rational system of fiscal centralization. This mechanism does not exist in the Eurozone
and in this way the crisis will continue to affect the performance of the EU.
5. The K eynesian cr it ique
6. Conclusion
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